Teacher Certification Program and Social Envy at the Local Level

One of the most popular songs by Iwan Fals goes: Oemar Bakri, Oemar Bakri, the civil servant. Oemar Bakri, Oemar Bakri, forty years of tenure Being an honest and dedicated teacher is painful Oemar Bakri, Oemar Bakri generates a lot of ministers Also professors, physicians, engineers But why is the teacher’s salary being cut?

The image of Oemar Bakri, who rides his bicycle to school, has been the best representation of teachers in the past. Many teachers had to moonlight in other professions and do odd jobs just to make ends meet. As the song correctly identifies cases of salary cuts were pervasive at that time.

Both the Old and New Order Regimes were considered under-spenders in education. Tempo (2000) reported that for a time, Indonesia was placed among the lowest ranking countries in the world in terms of its education budget. Moreover, education spending was focused on building infrastructure while neglecting the issue of teachers’ salaries. The Teachers’ Hymn which designates them as “heroes without medals” was an accurate expression of teachers’ hard work without proper reward.

The whole landscape of education changed following in the Reformasi era. Law No.20/2003 on the National Education System (with judicial review from the Constitutional Court) and Law No.14/2005 on Teachers and Lecturers ensured that education spending is more than sufficient and introduced a shift away from infrastructure towards salaries and handsome allowances, which recognise qualifications. Paying professional allowances is believed to motivate teachers to upgrade their academic qualifications to bachelor’s degree level, and thus improve their teaching quality and, eventually, improve student performance.

Nine years since its implementation, an assessment of this teacher certification system is crucial, particularly because of its consequences for public spending. In the 2015 budget, the expenditure for professional allowances is projected to reach 70 trillion rupiahs, more than 6 times the allocation in 2010. Against total education spending, the professional allowances have increased from 5% in 2010 to 17% in 2015. Doubling the salary of all of Indonesia’s three million teachers —which is what the professional allowance scheme entails—would certainly expand the spending significantly. In the context of public spending, it is valid to ask the question of whether the impact justifies the expense.

Unfortunately, the World Bank’s 2014 quantitative study demonstrated an insignificant impact on both teacher quality and student learning outcomes. These findings come from a rigorous impact evaluation study conducted in 2009, 2011 and 2012 involving 360 schools.

In addition to these formal evaluations, it is also interesting to consider the perceptions of non-teacher stakeholders at the local level. Recent research by SMERU found that in general, officials in District Education Offices, District Personnel Offices, and District Parliaments highly doubt that a doubling of teachers’ wages can motivate teachers to perform better. In fact, many officials said that the uncertified teachers were more motivated than the certified ones.

If one asks non-teacher stakeholders to identify the impact of the certification program, the most common responses would be: increase of car ownership, expansion of school garages, and traffic jams caused by teachers travelling to school meetings. This is so because banks and vehicle dealers at the local level have been more aggressive in offering lavish consumption credit to certified teachers. Car loans, for example, can be paid flexibly depending on the transfer of allowance; no sanction is applied for late payment. Predictably enough, the teacher certification program has been well tapped by the commercial sector as an opportunity to boost business profits.

Meanwhile, the impact in terms of student learning outcomes could not be apparent to non-teacher stakeholders as the passing rate of National Exam had reached 100%, even before the certification program. Non-teacher stakeholder also explained that at the local level, the certified teachers rarely use the allowances to buy resources -- such as computers, laptops, or books -- to improve their teaching quality. This might help explain why professional allowances bear little impact on teacher quality.

These negative – and rather cynical – responses could be interpreted as an expression of social envy towards teachers. As the biggest component of the civil service, teachers are the most visible group at the local level. In general, most families have relatives working as teachers. Thus, any improvements in their welfare are certainly noticed. It is even more noticeable in the case where the households are composed of both husbands and wives are certified teachers. There are also cases of triple salary: when the certified teachers happen to work in remote, impoverished, or conflict-affected areas (Suryahadi and Sembodo, 2013).

Teachers’ working hour is another issue among civil servants. Government Regulation No. 74/2008 about Teachers stipulates that teachers should at least have 24 hours face-to-face teaching per week. Since this is the basis for claiming certification allowance, many teachers believe that their obligatory working hours are only 24 hours/week. However, the Minister of National Education Decree No 15/2010 about Minimum Service Standards (MSS) for Basic Education also stipulates that a permanent teacher is to work 37.5 hours per week which is similar to other civil servants. Teachers are expected to spend the other 13.5 hours doing other non teaching tasks in addition to 24 hours face to face teaching. Meanwhile the calculation of 37.5 hours becomes more complicated in the case where teachers have to teach in more than one school.

The ministerial decree urging 37.5 hours per week is indeed very difficult to enforce. SMERU study in 2013 found that the school principals were resistant to comply with this without referring to specific stipulation made by the district head. Difficult enforcement is also found in SMERU study in 2014 where 41% and 57% of teachers at the primary and secondary school level, respectively, work less than 37.5 hours a week. Many teachers, particularly those who already have sufficient class to teach, believe that their obligatory hours are only the 24 hours a week. Considering numerous school holidays, teachers might even work only for less months a year compared to civil servants. This luxury also generates social envy.

The teacher certification program has given teachers who meet the qualification criteria a stronger bargaining position by reducing their economic vulnerability. Any future effort to improve education policy will have to factor in the issue of teacher certification.

One example is the issue of teacher distribution; certified teachers would be extremely resistant to be moved to schools with an undersupply of teachers. Similarly, schools with an undersupply of civil servant teachers would find it extremely difficult to accommodate civil servant teachers if non-civil servant teachers in those schools already receive professional allowances. In any case, the transfer of teachers will affect the state of affairs of teaching hours at the school level. This is the main issue for professional allowances. Inefficiency in the education sector could be difficult to correct; while allowances are a positive in terms of teachers’ livelihoods and address a longstanding undervaluation of teachers, it also makes them less inclined to accept government direction.

The image of Oemar Bakri riding his bicycle is no longer relevant for today’s context. But his honesty and dedication is an indispensible referent for the improvement of education quality. The certification program should shift teachers’ motivations away from the appeal of a lifetime job as a civil servant, and instead encourage them to consider teaching as a profession in itself.

The writer is a researcher at the SMERU Research Institute. The opinions expressed are her own. Published in the Jakarta Post, Sat, July 11 2015

Chaotic statistics of Indonesian migrant workers

Indonesia has become one of the biggest migrant-sending countries in Asia after Sri Lanka and the Philippines (Hugo, 2009). But, are we aware of how many Indonesians are working abroad? No one probably knows the exact answer.

Estimates of the total number of migrant workers vary from 4 million (The Jakarta Post, 2012), 4.1 million (Bank Indonesia, 2011), to 6 million (Kompas, 2011). Meanwhile, the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) only reports very outdated figures of migrant flows for August 2007 and the Manpower and Transmigration Ministry’s website reports deployments from 2007 to 2009.

Is it so difficult to generate timely and accurate statistics of migrant workers? Before coming to that discussion, it is worth reviewing the institutions responsible for producing information on migrant workers.

First and foremost is BNP2TKI. With 19 provincial representatives (BP3TKI) and 14 representatives at the regency level (P4TKI), BNP2TKI should be able to provide monthly data on officially deployed migrant workers. It records broader information collected at the point of departure and the point of entry back into Indonesia.

Second is the Manpower and Transmigration Ministry, whose information comes from private recruitment agencies (PPTKIS). Article 14 of Law No. 39/2004 on the protection and placement of migrant workers grants the ministry the power to request reports from PPTKIS at regular intervals prior to approval of PPTKIS permit extensions.

Third, the Transportation Ministry has data on workers aboard foreign commercial ships, but irregularly shares the data.

Fourth, the Law and Human Rights Ministry, through the immigration office, retains individual records of the workers since it differentiates migrants’ passports from common ones.

Fifth, the Foreign Affairs Ministry by means of the Indonesian embassies and consular offices also store such data.

Sixth, the Communication and Information Ministry has been preparing an online information system for migrant workers since 2008. Since the system totally relies on the data contributed by the relevant institutions, it has not progressed well.

According to Law No. 39/2004, the institutions in charge of keeping the information on workers are PPTKIS, local governments through registration (Articles 22 and 36) and Indonesian embassies (Articles 71 and 74). The law does mention information systems, but it is unclear about the integration of data collected by various institutions.

It should come as no surprise that the existing statistics have no information on the migrants’ provinces and districts of origin. This is because the data is only disaggregated based on the placement unit.

For example, 2007 data only ranked Bandung as the seventh highest placement unit below Jakarta; Nunukan, East Kalimantan; Surabaya, East Java; Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara (NTB); Tanjung Pinang, Riau; and Semarang, Central Java.

Jakarta — home to 90 percent of PPTKIS — has continuously been the highest contributor to migrant worker outflows from 2007 to 2009. It serves as the transit area particularly for workers heading to Saudi Arabia. Workers from all over Indonesia come to Jakarta to undergo training and obtain work certificates before applying for Saudi visas.

Thus, West Java workers might be counted in Jakarta, which would explain the low numbers from Bandung’s placement unit. However, workers from NTB, whose popular destination is also Saudi Arabia, might be counted twice – once in NTB and once in Jakarta. The same case of double-counting might also happen in Nunukan and Tanjung Pinang, which appear to be the biggest placement units for people en route to Malaysia.

Moreover, the recording system contains vertical and horizontal discrepancies across institutions. The data recorded at the national level by BNP2TKI is not necessarily the same as that at the provincial and district level.

For example, East Java deployment reported differently by BP3TKI and BNP2TKI. Data produced by BP3TKI is also not necessarily the same as that in the regency level. Finally, data collected by BNP2TKI and the Immigration Office should be identical in theory, but in reality could be quite different.

Aside from ministry data, Statistics Indonesia maintains accessible data on emigration figures. Since 2005, the Village Potential Census (Podes) includes a single question on the number of workers abroad. However, since it is generated from interviews with village heads, rather than hard evidence, village heads might confuse the question about migrant workers with the flow of emigrants.

This might help to clarify why the total number of migrant workers in the Podes 2005 and 2008 was only one-fourth to one-sixth of earlier estimates mentioned earlier. Podes should, therefore, include both the questions on the numbers and flow of workers.

We can conclude that many government institutions collect migrant workers data, but each of them is partial, incomplete, and most probably overlapping, resulting in double-counting. At the same time, workers migrating for a second time, those working independently, and professionals would be less likely to be included, resulting in undercounting.

Another inherent problem concerns the prevalence of irregular/undocumented workers where policies in the destination country play an important role. For example, Malaysia allows migrants to buy work permits upon arrival.

Thus, workers leaving the country with tourist visas, who are considered being irregular/undocumented by Indonesia are indeed regular/documented by Malaysia. Hence, the information based only on regular/documented workers might distort the overall picture of overseas employment.

Tirtosudarmo (2007) wrote that the number of irregular/undocumented migrant workers might approach two to four times the number of regular/documented migrants.

Ultimately, statistics are not the goal but rather the means and tools for better management of international migration. Improving the governance of overseas workers encompasses many aspects, one of which is the improvement of statistical monitoring. Limitations of emigration statistics and their public access have imposed major constraints on research efforts.

We recommend that Statistics Indonesia conduct a nationally representative household survey covering relevant information on emigration, including workers’ profile such as gender, age, address, profession, education, wage, and destination country. The survey should incorporate workers preparing to depart, those currently working, and those who have already finished their work contract.

Palmira Permata Bachtiar, Jakarta | Thu, 01/26/2012 10:27 AM
The writer is a researcher at the SMERU Research Institute. The opinions expressed are her own.

Local Government and Good Emigration Governance

Every year, hundreds of thousands of Indonesians go overseas to work. The National Agency of Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) recorded that in 2009 748,825 people went overseas to work, three quarters of them women.

The massive flow has shaped emigration over the last 15 years. Compared to 1994, the 2009 figure represents a 300 percent increase, a magnitude that is extremely difficult to manage. In terms of stock, moderate figures of Indonesian overseas workers amount to between 4.5 million and 6 million people.

A dramatic increase of migrant flow and stock following the 1997 economic crisis will unavoidably augment the likelihood of problems. Migrant workers are inherently vulnerable.

They are prone to danger even if they migrate legally, let alone if they migrate illegally/irregularly. The International Labor Organization estimated that Indonesian illegal/irregular migrations outnumbered legal ones by 2 to 4 times in 2009 (Tirtosudarmo, 2009).

Due to the complex nature of emigration, good governance is a must. For one thing, we are sending a huge number of female laborers to do the “3 Ds” (dirty, difficult, dangerous) types of work.

For another thing, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are the two biggest destination countries of Indonesian workers; both are not open in terms of handling human rights issues and with them the government has not been able to draft a bilateral agreement.

Without good governance, Indonesia can fall into the trap of endorsing forced labor or people trafficking.

The question is who should be held responsible for emigration governance in the context of a decentralized Indonesia. Indeed, policy and institutional framework seems to be inconclusive in the division of labor between central and local governments.

It is particularly inconclusive because overseas employment lies in the area of employment as well as foreign affairs. Law No. 32/2004 on regional development stipulates that employment is a decentralized matter whether foreign or not.

On the other hand, those in favor of centralized governance argue that Law No. 13/2003 on employment (articles 33 and 34) clearly differentiates between domestic and overseas employment; the latter being regulated by different law (Naekma and Pageh, 2009). Consequently, the migrant worker issues which are not regulated by Law No. 13/2003 are also the issues that are not decentralized.

One year after the passing of the employment law, the migrant law was approved by the House of Representatives, i.e. Law No. 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers.

The law mandates the establishment of the BNP2TKI: A body with service centers in 15 provinces (BP3TKI), and four service posts at the district level (BP4TKI). Indirectly, the formation of the BNP2TKI reinforces that from the perspective of the government, overseas employment is more of a centralist matter.

However, a series of interviews I held with NGOs — including the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan), Ecosoc Rights, Unifem, Migrant Care — demonstrated strong support for decentralization in emigration governance. Although overseas employment has foreign affairs elements, the centralist management will be unable to handle the micro-level problems.

Compared to violence and abuse by employers in the destination countries, problems such as identity fraud, cheat, systematic extortion, detention, etc. which occur in Indonesia make up 80 percent of the problems faced by migrants.

Problems that actually happen at the local level can be more effectively handled by the local government.

This is in line with Law No. 32/2004 (article 14), which requires local governments to provide service and protection for the workers in their local jurisdiction.

One should not forget that it is in the interest of the local government to pursue good emigration governance. The most tangible gain from emigration — the remittance — is more influential at the local rather than national level. In 2009 Blitar District recorded Rp 117 billion in remittances, equal to 10 percent of the regional budget (APBD).

Meanwhile, the remittances of West Lombok reached Rp 395 billion or 10 times more than its total local revenue (PAD).

At the same time, the pain of emigration is also more significant locally. Problems of violence, abuse and other social costs end up being problems for the local governments to solve. It is therefore in the interest of the local governments to pursue good emigration governance to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of emigration.

The context of decentralization has given room to local governments’ initiative to fill in the existing policy gaps.

For example, protection mechanisms have been missing from national policy frameworks and hence can be the area where the local governments intervene.

Good practices in emigration governance have been demonstrated by some regions. West Lombok and Blitar regencies are among a few regions that have broken new ground by establishing the migrant protection commission (the forthcoming SMERU). These local initiatives need to be learned by other migrant-source regions.

However, not all local governments are ready to intervene. Although, Law No. 32/2004 sufficiently encourages them to take active roles, the majority of regional governments lack the capacity to perform additional emigration tasks.

More importantly, they lack the budget to conduct these tasks. In other words, local governments do potentially have power, but in general they still lack necessary authorities.

It is therefore about time that the new migrant workers’ law empowers local governments by giving them more authority, enhancing their capacity, and allocating for them a sufficient budget so that they can execute these tasks.

Emigration is such a complex issue that the central government alone cannot manage it. Yet, that is just fine because the central government can empower the local governments and divide the work with them.


The writer is a researcher at the SMERU Research Institute and is working on a study funded by the International Development Research Center on international migration and decentralization. The opinions expressed here are hers.

Palmira Permata Bachtiar, Jakarta | Thu, 12/23/2010 10:25 AM | Opinion
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/12/23/local-govts-key-emigration-governance.html

Law revision is key to protecting workers

Does the state sufficiently protect migrant workers? To answer this, one should refer to the Law on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers.

To begin with, the spirit of the law is purely commercial and designed to promote sending as many workers overseas as possible. Its focus on protection is far from adequate. Out of the law’s 109 articles, only eight deal with protection.

The law shows inconsistency in addressing migrant worker rights. Articles 7(a) and 8(b) stipulate that the state guarantees rights, including the right for correct and reliable information about the overseas labor market and placement procedures. But then it simply hands over information provision to private recruitment agencies.

No one would be surprised if the latter did not pass on correct information and other important facts that might go against their vested interests. For example, recruitment agencies might not inform workers about their rights in industrial relations fearing that this would spoil their reputation in supplying obedient workers.

Or the agencies might not reveal true information about working conditions that might make prospective workers lose interest. The issue then is who will guarantee that these profit-oriented entities convey accurate information? If they violate the rules, what will the sanctions be?

Article 7(e) of the law maintains that the state must provide protection to migrant workers prior to, during and after employment. Article 82, however, stipulates that private recruitment agencies are responsible for protecting migrant workers according to placement contracts. Aside from this inconsistency, how can we ensure that the agencies are doing what the law mandates and what are the sanctions if they do not?

The law is unclear about how to protect workers from extortion and exploitation. Although article 39 instructs the private recruitment agencies to bear all costs except as otherwise stated, article 76 (1) and (2) allow private recruitment agencies to pass on to workers the costs of processing identity documents, health and psychological tests, job training and professional certificates and others items as further specified by the government.

Further, article 43 of a Manpower and Transmigration Ministry regulation says that other chargeable costs, such as visas, food and accommodation during training, airfare and airport taxes, local transportation, insurance and, last but not least, agency service fees be paid for by employees.

According to article 76 (3), these costs must be transparent. However who will assure that these commercial organizations do not overcharging workers.

Supervision is crucial for legal enforcement. The law is ambiguous in the matter. On the one hand, article 92 (1) denotes that government agencies, including those at the provincial and district levels, are responsible for supervision. On the other hand, article 95 (2) says that supervision is the task of BNP2TKI (National Board for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers). The relationship between BNP2TKI and local governments remains blurred.

More seriously, six years after the law came into effect, both the supervision mechanism (article 92 [3]) and the reporting mechanism of supervision (article 93 [2]) have still not been implemented by government or ministerial regulation. Without such regulation, supervision will be very difficult.

In regard to disputes between workers and agencies, the law suggests that both parties seek common ground informally and peacefully (article 85 [1]). Court solutions are only a last resort if parties fail to meet half way (article 85 [2]). At the same time, the stipulated punishment of offenses is lenient. Article 100 of the law imposes only administrative sanctions on errant agencies, ranging from issuing written warnings to revoking business licenses. The law is weak not only in terms of prevention but also in terms of enforcement.

The state exists to ensure protection of workers’ human rights. However, the state, at the very least, cannot even protect the workers’ consumer rights. The migrants are the clients of the agencies. They are also the clients of insurance companies. Each of them pay a premium of Rp 400.000 (US$44.40) under article 68 of the law and article 12 of the ministerial regulation.

In addition, the state levies a charge of $15 on each worker under the so-called Assistance and Protection Program. This is exactly in line with the law’s general idea: Protection should come from the migrants themselves.

It is high time to consider the adoption of international standards for effective protection and good emigration governance. Indonesia has ratified eight ILO Core Conventions in relation to workers’ rights and has signed the UN Convention on Protection of Migrant Workers and Their Families. Indonesian law must be revised to comply with these conventions. Consequently, it has to acknowledge the gender dimension in overseas employment. It also has to recognize the presence of irregular migrants — the unregistered ones and those without legal documents — and to make sure the fulfillment of their basic human rights.

The revised law needs to ensure that the recruitment process occurs in a professional, transparent, and accountable manner. It should envisage effective mechanism for monitoring and supervision of the private recruitment agencies as well as the migrant workers.

Legal revision is necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. It has to be followed with the drafting of a domestic workers law and finally the ratification of the UN Convention on Migrant Workers and Their Families.

Legislators have promised to revise the law by the end of this year. With less than one month to go, no one knows exactly what the progress is. Does this mean that legal protection is the last concern of the state?

The writer is a researcher at the SMERU Research Institute and is working on a study funded by the International Development Research Center on international migration and decentralization. The opinions expressed here are the writer’s.

Palmira Bachtiar, Jakarta | Mon, 12/13/2010 9:21 AM | Opinion
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/12/13/law-revision-key-protecting-workers.html

ACFTA and the threat of internal trade barriers

Early this month, the governments of Indonesia and China decided to proceed with the full implementation of the ACFTA. Renegotiation was considered much more costly because in addition to compensation, Indonesia will have to renegotiate with China and also with other ASEAN countries.

Instead, China offers technical assistance in improving competitiveness of Indonesia’s SMEs in terms of machinery, logistics, and promotion (The Jakarta Post, April 13, 2010).

Without underestimating that effort, this article intends to discuss the already weak competitiveness of Indonesian products. The reason is straightforward: trade barriers imposed by local governments.

The weird phenomenon is that government liberalizes trade with other countries at the national level, yet the opposite happens at the regional level where trade barriers are still imposed to our local producers.

Although no regional governments deny the importance of trade and investment on employment generation and poverty reduction, very few would set aside the distraction of local revenue at the cost of the long-term business climate.

Coupled with the decentralized authority, most local government would end up exercising their power by issuing regional regulations (Perdas) to extract tax and levies. Trade barriers are applied to regulated (read: restricted) commodities, particularly agricultural and forestry products.

As an example, one truck of tamarind from Kabupaten (regency) Timor Tengah Utara (TTU) will have to complete the so-called certificate of origin that lasts only for 2 days.

The certificate charges certain prices to pay for each kilogram of tamarind exported out of the district.

Tamarind is assumed, either to be collected in government forest or be the harvest of government distributed seeds. Heaven knows who invented this logic!

To add to the complication, the certificate is issued only after verification by the Forestry Agency. With this transportation document in hand, a trader has to rush to reach Kupang Port before the certificate expires.

Else, they must complete the whole process again in TTU.

Meanwhile bad road condition delays the transportation time twice as much.

Worse, along the long and winding road, it has to pass 10 posts, each costs it not less than Rp 15.000 (US$1.6). Thus, even with the complete transportation document, the trader just cannot avoid the illegal fees.

Once arrives in Kupang, the certificate has to be replaced with the one issued by Agriculture Agency in Kupang.

Everything has to hasten to ensure the goods do not miss the ship to Java.

In theory, exchange of TTU certificate to Kupang’s cost zero, but in reality nothing seems to be a free lunch when one has to be proceeded hastily.

In general, this illustrates what happens to agricultural and forestry commodities in Indonesia: trade barriers — be it tariff and non-tariff barriers (which practically also cost money) or legal and illegal ones – which massively inflate the cost and time of transportation.

This is understandable if consumers in Java would choose cheaper imported agricultural products than local ones. If the local producers could not win the game in their own field, how could we expect them to compete in international market?

Historically, regional regulations on trade (and investment) barriers, the so-called problematic perdas, have been repressively eliminated through Law No. 18/1999 as the implementation of the Letter of Intent with the IMF in 1998. Its amendment (Law No. 34/2000), however, terminated the deregulation process allowing the problematic perdas to mushroom again.

The newly passed Law No. 28/2009 will be the only hope in putting the free internal trade back to track.

Theoretically, under the “close system”, the legalization of such perdas will be out of question.

There are two things that arise concerning this expectation. First, SMERU (2009) found that the anti-trade element might not be stipulated in the perdas, but in the lower bylaws, for example the decree of the governor, mayor or district head.

Second, under a 2009 law, the Home Ministry no longer has the power to cancel the problematic perdas. They can only be annulled by a Presidential Regulation, which will take ages, on the account of already piling up burdern of the president.

Meanwhile, the barrier to cancel perdas is rooted in the legal framework that divides the interpretation into two groups.

One group has the opinion that perda is part of national policy framework and therefore the central government has the authority to annul perdas that are against the higher laws.

The other group believes that perda is the product of autonomous regional parliament. Hence, it can only be invalidated by the regional court.

In both cancellation cases — be it through the presidential regulation or the local court — uncertainty increases and business climate deteriorates.

One breakthrough might be to consider inter-regional trade as one of the national affairs (Hadi Soesastro, 2001). He argued that this had been the case in many other countries where distribution of goods and services was kept free and becomes part of the national economic management.

Only then the gains from trade can be captured by both national and regional governments.

Back to the issue of the ACFTA implementation. The Chinese government promised technical assistance to improve our competitiveness. Yet, we cannot expect fruitful outcomes without fixing those problematic perdas.

The government has to do something, at least not let the local producers fight alone and struggle to survive against the red tape.

To end, many would consider the ACFTA a threat. The real threat, however, is the internal trade barrier as it violates the principle of Indonesia as one unity of the free economic zone (Hadi Susastro, 2001).

Trade barriers weaken our product competitiveness, but more dangerously it threatens our national integrity.

We cannot expect fruitful outcomes without fixing those problematic perdas.


The writer is a SMERU researcher. This article expresses her personal opinion.

Palmira Permata Bachtiar, Jakarta | Wed, 04/28/2010 9:01 AM | Opinion
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/04/28/acfta-and-threat-internal-trade-barriers.html

Perizinan Sektor Perikanan di Flores Ti mur

Bagi Kabupaten Flores Timur (Flotim), sektor perikanan adalah sektor primadona. Indikas inya sederhana: ada Pusat Pelelangan Ikan (PPI) yang dibangun Pemerintah Jepang dan ada dua perusahaan penanaman modal asing (PMA) dan delapan perusahaan penanaman modal dalam negeri (PMDN) di bidang perikanan dan budidaya mutiara. Perusa haan -perusahaan tersebut membeli ikan dari nelayan yang nilainya mencapai miliaran rupiah setiap bulannya. Sayangnya, perizinan disektor ini belum mendukung. Hal ini terungkap dalam diskusi kelompok terfokus (FGD) sektor perikanan yang dilakukan Lembaga Penelitian SMERU dalam rangka studi iklim usaha di Kabupaten Flotim (Bachtiar, Mawardi, dan Marbun, 2009). Dalam FGD tersebut (30 Mei 2009), para pelaku usaha men geluhkan perizinan yang rumit dan lama. Artikel ini membahas masalah liku-liku perizinan di bidang perikanan di Flotim, termasuk masalah prosedur dan persyaratannya.

Tiga Peraturan Daerah tentang Izin Usaha Perikanan (IUP)
Dalam tujuh tahun terakhir ini peraturan daerah (perda) IUP di Kabupaten Flotim sudah tiga kali berganti. Pertama , Peraturan Daerah (Perda) No. 7/2002 yang salah satu pasalnya mengatur masa berlakunya berbagai izin, yaitu 1–3 tahun (Pasal 5, Ayat 3). Perda tersebut dibatalkan oleh Keputusan Mendagri No. 135/2005 karena Pasal 5, Ayat 3 itu dianggap melanggar Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) No. 54/2002 tentang Usaha Perikanan yang menyatakan bahwa IUP berlaku selama perusahaan melakukan kegiatan usaha perikanan (Pasal 5, Ayat 2).

Oleh karena itu, dikeluarkan Perda No. 4/2006 yang dalam konsiderannya mencantumkan pelanggaran yang dimaksud. Namun, perda ini ternyata juga tidak menjelaskan tentang IUP yang berlaku seumur hidup sebagaimana diatur dalam PP No. 54/2002 Pasal 5, Ayat 2. Dalam Perda No. 4/2006, Pasal 5, Ayat 3 disebutkan: “Jangka waktu berlakunya IUP akan diatur lebih lanjut dengan Keputusan Bupati.”

Belum sampai dua tahun, keluar lagi Perda No. 14/2008 tentang Retribusi IUP dengan konsideran Pasal 18 PP No. 54/2002 yang menyatakan perlunya pungutan terhadap pengusaha perikanan atas manfaat sumber daya ikan. Ada beberapa kejanggalan dalam
perda ini. Pertama, tidak ada pasal di dalamnya yang membatalkan perda sebelumnya sehingga berpotensi menimbulkan kerancuan.

Kedua, perda ini berjudul retribusi IUP, namun retribusi IUP tidak disebutkan dalam perda (lihat Tabel 1). Ketiga, dalam Pasal 1, Butir 16 disebutkan bahwa izin usaha perikanan IUP adalah “izin yang harus diberikan kepada (dan bukan harus dimiliki oleh) orang pribadi atau badan dalam melakukan kegiatan di bidang perikanan.” Acuan ini menjadi rancu jika izin yang harus diberikan ternyata dikenakan retribusi.

Perizinan Bermasalah
Surat Izin Laik Operasi (SLO)
SLO merupakan izin baru yang belum ada dalam dua perda sebelumnya. Menurut Kepala Dinas Perikanan (wawancara, 4 Juni 2009), SLO mensyaratkan adanya surat izin usaha perikanan (SIUP), surat izin penangkapan ikan (SIPI), dan surat keterangan anak buah kapal (SKABK). Untuk mendapatkan SKABK harus ada ijazah nahkoda dan kepala kamar mesin. Ijazah ini hanya dapat diperoleh dari Maumere dengan biaya tidak kurang dari 1 juta rupiah.

Surat Izin Berlayar (SIB)
SIB menjadi lebih rumit lagi perolehannya karena sifatnya lintas instansi. Izin untuk menangkap ikan, tidak cukup SIUP, SIPI, dan SLO dari Dinas Perikanan saja. Pelaku usaha masih harus mengurus SIB dari syahbandar. SIB akan keluar jika SLO dilengkapi dengan buku pelaut dan sijil (daftar awak kapal) serta bukti pelunasan asuransi (lihat Gambar 1).

Surat-Surat Lain untuk Pengangkutan Hasil Perikanan
Selain surat izin pengangkutan hasil perikanan yang disyaratkan oleh Perda No. 14/200 8, pelaku usaha pengangkutan hasil laut masih memerlukan empat surat lain, yaitu: (i) surat penjualan hasil laut antar kabupaten; (ii) surat keterangan asal barang (SKAB); (iii) berita acara pemeriksaan barang; dan (iv) surat keterangan mutu barang. Biaya keempat surat ini masing-masing Rp35.000. Surat-surat ini mencerminkan birokrasi yang pada prinsipnya bertentangan dengan ketentuan bahwa Indonesia merupakan satu kesatuan perdagangan bebas. Artinya, setiap warga negara seharusnya bebas berdagang di dalam wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI).

Penutup
Berbagai perizinan di atas menjadi ilustrasi ekonomi biaya tinggi. Di satu pihak, kajian tekstual memperlihatkan bahwa Perda No. 14/2008 sendiri secara substantif tidak memuat persyaratan dan lama pengurusan izin. Ketidakjelasan ini membuka peluang
pungutan liar oleh oknum. Oleh karena itu, perda tersebut perlu direvisi. Di lain pihak, kajian kontekstual menunjukkan banyaknya keluhan pelaku usaha perikanan terhadap pungutan liar di lapangan. Lebih parah lagi, sekalipun telah melengkapi
perizinan, mereka tetap harus membayar biaya tambahan kepada petugas di lapangan.

Perizinan Usaha Mi numan Beralkohol di Kota Kupang

Budaya masyaakat Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) sangat dekat dengan minuman keras. Sopi atau moke merupakan sajian wajib pada berbagai acara adat: memulai musim tanam , musim panen, “minta nona ” (melamar), sampai acara kematian. Semuanya belum sahih tanpa minuman beralkohol (MB).

Namun, perizinan MB merupakan salah satu yang tersulit di Kota Kupang. Perizinan tersebut berlapis-lapis secara vertikal dan lintas sektoral: produsen ditangani oleh Departemen Perindustrian (Deprin), distributor dan subdistributor oleh Departemen Perdagangan (Depdag), dan pengecer oleh Dinas Perindustrian dan Perdagangan (Disperindag) Kota Kupang.

Secara singkat, tulisan ini menggam barkan berlikunya jalan yang harus dilalui pelaku usaha MB di Kota Kupang demi memperoleh legalitas bagi usahanya.

Izin Produksi, Distribusi, dan Subdistribusi
Untuk dapat mengurus perizinan di pusat (Deprin atau Deperindag), produsen MB perlu melengkapi perizinan standar di daerah terlebih dahulu. Setelah itu, ia baru dapat mengurus izin usaha industri (IUI) dari Deprin yang mensyaratkan kelulusan atas
berbagai pengujian oleh Badan Pengawasan Obat dan Makanan (Badan POM) Jakarta yang datang ke daerah. Selain itu, produsen wajib membayar cukai MB dalam bentuk label Rp1.000/botol.

Selanjutnya, produsen tidak diperkenankan memasarkan produknya sendiri. Produsen harus punya dan harus mengurus izin distributor dan subdistributor yang masing-masing merupakan perusahaan yang berbeda. Selain persyaratan standar di daerah,
surat izin usaha perdagangan (SIUP) MB harus diurus di Depdag Jakarta.

Izin Penjualan
Seperti disebutkan sebelumnya, produsen juga harus mengurus izin bagi para pengecernya. Ada dua macam pengecer MB: mereka yang menjual MB di toko-toko dan mereka yang menjual MB untuk langsung diminum (hotel, restoran, dan lain-lain). Ketentuan perizinannya diatur oleh (i) Peraturan Daerah (Perda) No.33/1998 tentang Surat Izin Tempat Usaha Minuman Beralkohol dan pembaruannya (Perda No. 6/2003), (ii) Perda No. 5/2001 tentang SIUP MB yang wajib didaftarkan setiap tahun.

Baik SITU MB maupun SIUP MB mensyaratkan pengecer untuk memiliki SITU umum, SIUP umum, dan tanda daftar perusahaan (TDP). Jenis MB yang dijual harus dicantumkan secara spesifik pada SIUP MB. Jika merek MB yang dijual dianggap ilegal, mereknya tidak tercantum dalam SIUP MB. Agar legal, setiap kali MB berganti merek, setiap kali pula SIUP diganti.

Apakah Prosedur Perizinan Efektif?
Rumit, mahal, dan lamanya perizinan MB bertujuan mem batas i produksi dan peredaran MB yang memang merupakan komoditas di bawah pengawasan. Selain itu, baik Polresta, Polda, maupun Satpol PP masing-masing punya jadwal rutin operasi penertiban untuk mengawasi produksi dan peredaran MB di lapangan. Pertanyaannya, efektifkah perizinan tersebut dalam menekan produksi dan peredaran MB?

Beberapa pihak yang diwawancarai mengatakan bahwa perlahan tetapi pasti jumlah produsen MB di Kota Kupang berkurang. Indikatornya, tingkat kecelakaan lalu lintas dirasakan berkurang. Ketatnya perizinan dan pengawasan dianggap cukup efektif.

Di sisi lain, ada pihak yang meragukan kesimpulan itu. Salah seorang pengecer laki-laki mengatakan bahwa yang justru terjadi adalah seleksi terhadap produsen (Slamet, bukan nama sebenarnya, laki-laki, wawancara, 29 Maret 2009, Kupang). Hanya produsen besar yang dapat bertahan. Sungguhpun demikian, permintaan MB masih terus bertambah. Buktinya, MB yang didatangkan dari Pulau Jawa membanjiri Kupang. Pengawasan yang ketat juga tidak selalu menimbulkan efek jera bagi para produsen dan pengecer MB ilegal karena meski ada peluang dirazia, selalu ada ruang untuk berspekulasi dan melanjutkan penjualan MB ilegal.

Seorang produsen tak berdokumen yang diwawancarai, sebut saja Pak Vin (50 tahun), mengatakan dirinya tidak mungkin menghentikan produksi karena permintaan selalu ada. Permintaan ada, keuntungan juga ada. Menurutnya, pekerja kasar selalu memerlukan MB di malam hari. MB tradisional buatan Pak Vin yang diberi ramuan akar-akaran penghilang rasa lelah dan menyegarkan tubuh. Pak Vin sendiri sudah berkali-kali dirazia petugas. Malam ini barangnya disita, besok dia mulai lagi dari nol (wawancara, 20 Maret 2009, Kupang).

Di satu pihak, perizinan dan pengawasan menjadikan MB legal makin mahal. Di lain pihak, ada MB ilegal untuk memenuhi permintaan yang tidak menurun karena pada dasarnya MB adalah bagian dari budaya setempat. Ketatnya aturan menyebabkan terjadinya polarisasi produsen MB menjadi dua kelompok, yakni besar sekali atau mikro seperti Pak Vin. Produsen besar harus selalu waspada terhadap masuknya MB Jawa, produsen mikro harus bertahan di pasar gelap sambil kucing-kucingan dengan petugas.

Pemerintah Pusat yang memegang kendali kebijakan atas produksi dan peredaraan MB perlu mempertimbangkan keberadaan pelaku usaha MB lokal. Peraturan bagi produsen berskala kecil dan mikro seharusnya tidak disamakan dengan produsen besar. Kajian
mendalam mengenai hal ini memungkinkan ditemukannya titik di mana pelaku usaha skala kecil dan mikro dapat terus berusaha tanpa mengabaikan pengendalian dan pengawasan MB itu sendiri.

Kotak 1. Punahnya Kejayaan MB Lokal
Saksi hidup kejayaan MB lokal adalah Pak Slamet (bukan nama sebenarnya), salah satu pemain besar di era 1970-an ketika MB masih merupakan barang bebas. Usahanya bangkrut
pada 1985 ketika secara tegas peraturan provinsi melarang produksi MB.

Lima belas tahun sesudahnya, Pak Slamet mencoba bangkit lagi. Namun, karena sudah tua dan sakit-sakitan, Pak Slamet tidak mungkin lagi bekerja sekeras dulu untuk mengumpulkan modal. Jika 1 botol MB berharga Rp5.000, maka diperlukan Rp120.000.000 untuk produksi stok 1.000 peti atau 24.000 botol demi melayani pasar di Kupang dan kabupaten sekitarnya. Paling tidak perlu Rp150.000.000 untuk biaya produksi stok, perizinan bagi distributor, subdistributor, dan pengecer, serta label MB/botol. Belum lagi beberapa izin harus diurus di Jakarta.

Menurut Pak Slamet, pengurusan SIUP MB bagi pengecer oleh produsen laksana berjudi karena merek MB yang diproduksi belum tentu disukai pasar. Jika merek tersebut diganti, SIUP harus diganti. Secara umum, posisi pengecer paling aman. Selain tidak perlu membayar tunai karena produsen tidak menuntut pembayaran langsung, para pengecer tidak perlu mengurus SIUP sehingga aman dari risiko kebangkrutan. Sebaliknya, selain harus bermodal kuat, produsen juga harus pandai membaca keinginan konsumen dan sanggup bersaing dengan MB dari Pulau Jawa.

Bagi Pak Slamet, kejayaan MB lokal adalah masa lalu. Ironisnya, MB lokal terancam punah oleh kemajuan transportasi dan komunikasi. Ketika akses ke Kupang masih sulit, MB lokal menjadi raja di kampung sendiri. Kini, pengecer tinggal mengangkat telepon untuk memesan barang dari Jawa. Keesokan harinya, pesanan tiba di Kupang. MB lokal kalah bersaing dengan MB Jawa, apalagi MB Jawa dianggap lebih bergengsi (wawancara dengan Slamet, 60, 19 Maret 2009, Kupang).

http://smeru.or.id/newslet/2009/news29.pdf